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Abstract—Chess involves the capacity to reason iteratively
about potential intentional choices of an opponent and
therefore involves high levels of explicit theory of mind
[ToM] (i.e. ability to infer mental states of others) alongside
clear, strategic rule-based decision-making. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging was used on 12 healthy male
novice chess players to identify cortical regions associated
with chess, ToM and empathizing. The blood-oxygenation-
level-dependent (BOLD) response for chess and empathiz-
ing tasks was extracted from each ToM region. Results
showed neural overlap between ToM, chess and empathiz-
ing tasks in right-hemisphere temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) [BA40], left-hemisphere superior temporal gyrus
[BA22] and posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23/31]. TPJ is sug-
gested to underlie the capacity to reason iteratively about
another’s internal state in a range of tasks. Areas activated
by ToM and empathy included right-hemisphere orbitofron-
tal cortex and bilateral middle temporal gyrus: areas that
become active when there is need to inhibit one’s own expe-
rience when considering the internal state of another and for
visual evaluation of action rationality. Results support previ-
ous findings, that ToM recruits a neural network with each
region sub-serving a supporting role depending on the nat-
ure of the task itself. In contrast, a network of cortical
regions primarily located within right- and left-hemisphere
medial-frontal and parietal cortex, outside the internal repre-
sentational network, was selectively recruited during the
chess task. We hypothesize that in our cohort of novice
chess players the strategy was to employ an iterative think-
ing pattern which in part involved mentalizing processes
and recruited core ToM-related regions.! 2017 The Authors.
Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of IBRO. This is an open
access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Key words: theory of mind, chess, empathizing, temporo-
parietal junction, fMRI.
INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM), also referred to as intentionality
and mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 1999; Vo¨llm et al.,
2006), is the ability to infer the intentions, beliefs or mental
states of others in order to explain and predict behavior
(Powell et al., 2010, 2014; Stiller and Dunbar, 2007). Neu-
roimaging literature suggests that ToM is associated with
a distributed network of cortical regions (reviewed by
Carrington and Bailey, 2009, and Lieberman, 2007).
Regions most commonly reported include, medial frontal
gyrus [MFG: BA8/9], inferior frontal gyrus [IFG: BA47],
ventromedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC)
[both of which partially overlap orbital PFC and include
BA11], temporoparietal junction [TPJ: BA40], superior
temporal sulcus [STS: BA21] and precuneus [BA7] (see
Powell et al., 2014). The extent to which these diﬀerent
regions are involved depends on the nature of the social
cognitive task being used (Lieberman, 2007; Powell
et al., 2014). A ‘core-network’ for ToM has been pro-
posed, which includes medial PFC (mPFC) and bilateral
TPJ (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Mitchell, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). These regions are
consistently engaged whenever we reason about the
mental states of others, regardless of task and stimuli
(Schurz et al., 2014). Empathizing, while important for
inferring the emotional states of others and for successful
social interaction (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), is diﬀerent to ToM: it is
the capacity to comprehend, infer, judge and share the
emotional experiences of another (Gallese, 2003). Using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Vo¨llm
et al. (2006) showed that ToM and empathy are associ-
ated with overlapping but distinct neural networks.
Knowing how another person thinks and ‘thinks you
think’ etc. is critical to predicting behavior in strategic
interaction games (Camerer et al., 2005). Iterated strate-
gic thinking consumes working memory and requires the
ability to metaphorically ‘put ourselves in another player’s
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mind’ (Camerer et al., 2005). It seems then that ToM and
strategic interactions both require similar cognitive pro-
cesses. However, while strategic interactions require iter-
ative reasoning about another’s mind state from a purely
strategic perspective (where the potential moves are pre-
defined and based on a set of structured rules, as is the
case during strategic interactions), ToM requires iterative
reasoning about another’s mind state within social con-
texts (where rules are much less well defined, ambiguity
is pervasive and decisions are based on prior experience
and expectations which might be culturally and contextu-
ally embedded).
Studies exploring strategic interactions during gaming
situations (e.g. the Prisoners Dilemma, Dictator and
Ultimatum games) suggest that the ability to infer the
mental states of one’s opponent is beneficial to making
the best choice (McCabe et al., 2001; Sally and Hill,
2006; Behrens et al., 2009). The game of chess involves
facets of high-level cognition and problem-solving abilities
(Atherton et al., 2003) and, at least in novice chess play-
ers, the capacity to reason iteratively about the potential
moves of the opponent. It provides a simple environment,
using chess pieces that have a finite number of moves but
through which an immense number of possibilities can be
generated (2143, see de Groot and Gobet, 1996). Games
like the prisoners’ dilemma and ultimatum game have a
social motive or empathizing component which occurs
during a strategic interaction (for example, altruism, fair-
ness, reciprocity, and cooperation), which is not present
in the game of chess. The strategies of novice chess play-
ers diﬀer from those employed by expert chess players.
Expert chess players are thought to automatically call to
memory perceptual patterns of game play (known as
‘chunks’) when perceiving familiar positions (Chase and
Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998) and use them for carrying
out look-ahead search (Gobet, 1997), whereas novice
chess players proceed only using an iterative strategic
thinking pattern. This would suggest that in novice chess
players there is a large degree of neural overlap when the
chess players are considering potential moves on a chess
board and tasks that involve assigning mental states to
others (i.e. ToM-related tasks), and this is the primary
aim of the present study.
To explore the underlying mechanisms of social
cognition, some neurocognitive studies have used a
game theory approach (e.g. King-Casas et al., 2008;
Behrens et al., 2009; Tayama et al., 2012). During games
that involve strategic interactions, fMRI and positron
emission tomography (PET) studies show that playing
humans versus computers activates ToM areas
(Gallagher et al., 2002; Camerer, 2009). This suggests
that strategic interactions during games that require an
iterative component are not purely based on a computa-
tional task, but do require some degree of social cognition
such as the understanding that the other player holds a
mind state that is diﬀerent from one’s own. Few studies
have looked at the neural correlates of chess, but those
that have, show neural regions associated with chess in
bilateral frontal lobes, parietal lobes and occipital lobes
(Atherton et al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005). This study
will investigate the neural network associated with ToM,
using a well-established ToM task (Vo¨llm et al., 2006)
and identify whether a significant blood-oxygenation-
level-dependent (BOLD) response for the processing of
a chess task and empathizing task is significant within
those pre-defined regions identified using the ToM task.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
Participants were 12 males, all right-handed, aged 20–
58 years (mean age = 36.42yrs, SD = 13.91yrs). All
are chess players with diﬀerent levels of experience,
who know the rules of chess and have at some point
belonged to a chess club. Years playing chess ranged
from 4 to 48 years (mean years playing
chess = 26.33yrs, SD = 13.75yrs). Participants learned
to play chess between 6 and 17 years of age (mean age
learned to play chess = 10.17yrs, SD = 3.22yrs).
Intensity of play refers to the frequency of chess play.
For the individual to qualify as having played chess with
intense periods of play, they must have played regularly
at a chess club for a period of 6 months and report
playing the game at least three times a week.
Participants were recruited from University of Liverpool
and Merseyside Chess clubs. All participants gave
signed informed consent, and the study had the
approval of the local research ethics committee.
Neuropsychological protocol
Participants completed an imposing memory task (IMT)
used previously (Lewis et al., 2011; Powell et al., 2010,
2012a, 2014). The IMT provides a measure of the individ-
uals’ ability to infer the mental states of others. The task
involves reading five short stories twice, each approxi-
mately 200 words in length. Stories depict a social situa-
tion (e.g. an employee trying to decipher, from a work
colleague, whether a diﬀerent colleague might be inter-
ested in him). Following each story, the participant
answers a set of 20 true/false questions containing an
equal number of intentionality questions and factual
(short-term memory) questions to distinguish between
intentionality capacity and ability to remember factual
information. Intentionality questions require complex
mentalizing about a character’s perspective within a
social situation. The questions vary in complexity and
require the individual to represent the mind states of
others, up to and including level six intentionality and
short-term memory. Further details of the IMT, including
an example story and questions, as well as the equation
for calculating intentionality and short-term memory
scores, are provided in Powell et al. (2014).
fMRI activation tasks
Participants completed three experimental tasks in the
scanner: a Theory of Mind (ToM) task, an empathizing
task and a chess task. Task stimuli were presented
using ‘Presentation’ software (https://nbs.neuro-bs.com).
All stimuli were presented in blocks. The ToM task and
empathizing task have been used previously (Brunet
et al., 2000; Vo¨llm et al., 2006). With these two tasks,
the participant is first presented with a short comic strip
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consisting of three images. A further two images are then
presented below. The participant is asked to choose
which of the two further images complete the story emerg-
ing from the first three images the best. The chess task
was designed to match as closely as possible the design
of the ToM and the empathizing tasks. The participants
are presented with a strip of images of a chess board
depicting a game in progress. Further two images are pre-
sented below this and the participant is asked to decide
which of the two depicted moves in the further images
would make the most sense within the sequential four
move series. In all conditions, participants pressed the left
key for ‘‘Image 1” and the right key for ‘‘Image 2”.
Theory of mind and empathizing task designs. In the
ToM task, the experimental condition involved inferring
the mental state of the character in the story. The
participant is asked ‘‘What will the character do next?”
In this condition, no social interactions of emotional
situations are depicted and therefore there is only one
character in the story. In the empathizing task, the
participant is asked, ‘‘What will make the main character
feel better?” The participant must empathize with the
protagonist in the story in order to make the correct
answer. Two characters are depicted in the empathizing
condition. In the control condition the participant is
presented with a story that requires only comprehension
of the physical causalities of the protagonist in the story
and must decide ‘‘What is most likely to happen next?”
In order to match for the correct number of characters in
the story and its complexity, the control condition for the
ToM task included only one character while the control
condition for the empathizing task included two
characters. Thus in total there were four categories of
story: 1. Theory of Mind (‘ToM’); 2. Empathizing
(‘Empathy’); 3. Physical causality with one character
(‘Physical 1’); and 4. Physical causality with two
characters (‘Physical 2’). There are ten diﬀerent stories
per condition. Each story is presented twice with each
block consisting of five diﬀerent stories resulting in a
total of four blocks per condition. A short question
introducing the block is shown for 6 s. The comic strip
depicting the story is shown in the upper half of the
screen for 6 s and the two pictures showing the possible
outcomes of the scenario are imposed on the bottom
half of the screen for a further 6 s, during which the
participant must respond with their correct answer.
Chess task design. In the experimental chess task
(‘chess’), the participants had to decide ‘‘What move
would you make?” This scenario depends on the
participant following the progression of a game as it
develops and deciding which out of two options,
depicting the next move, they would make next. The
chess games were chosen at random from a database
of previous chess masters’/grandmasters’ games (http://
www.chess.com/games/) with the starting point randomly
selected from the game. An example of the chess task
and control condition is shown in Fig. 1. Participants
must choose between two images to indicate the move
that they would make next if they were playing the
game. One image is the move taken by the chess
master/grandmaster during the chess game (correct
response) and the second image shows a move of a
diﬀerent chess piece (incorrect response). In the control
condition (‘ball’) the participant has to decide ‘‘Where will
the ball land next?” The participants are instructed that
there is only one rule in the ball scenario which is that
the ball can only move from one side of the board to the
opposite site, i.e. either left to right or top to bottom, but
never, for example, from the top of the board to the left
or right side or from the right side of the board to the top
or bottom of the board. The ball is shown in yellow to
match the yellow presented in the chess task condition.
This scenario depends only on physical causality and
requires the participant to follow where the ball has
moved from or to. The chess pieces are also randomly
dispersed on the board. The placement of the pieces in
the middle of the squares was avoided, as suggested by
Atherton et al. (2003), to avoid participants considering
possible moves. A total of twelve diﬀerent scenarios per
condition were used. Each block consists of three diﬀerent
scenarios resulting in four blocks per condition. At the
beginning of each block participants are presented with a
short question introducing the block: shown for 6 s. The
block consists of two diﬀerent games. The strip depicting
the game or ball in progress is shown in the upper half of
the screen for 12 s and the two pictures showing the pos-
sible outcomes of the scenario are imposed on the bottom
half of the screen for a further 12 s.
MRI data acquisition
MR images were obtained using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio
(Siemens Medical, Erlangen, Germany) scanner with an
eight-channel head coil. High-resolution T1-weighted
anatomical images were acquired sagitally using the
following parameters: TE 5.57 ms, TR 2040 ms, flip angle
8", FOV = 256, 176 slices, voxel size 1 ! 1 ! 1 mm3.
Functional images were obtained using a T2-weighted
gradient echo EPI sequence with the following
parameters: TE = 35 ms; TR = 3000 ms; flip angle 90",
slice thickness 3 mm, 0.3 mm gap, matrix 64 ! 64,
FOV= 192 mm; in-plane resolution 3 ! 3 mm, 43 slices.
Forty-three axial slices oriented parallel to the AC-PC line
covering the whole brain were taken. Foam padding was
used to prevent head movements during the scan.
MRI data analysis
The Statistical Parametric Mapping software package
(SPM8, available at Welcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm)
was used for realignment, normalization and smoothing
and statistical analysis to create statistical parametric
maps of significant regional BOLD response changes
(Friston et al., 1995a,b). Prior to pre-processing the first
two images of each experimental run were discarded.
The image time series was first realigned to the first
image (of the remaining time series). Sinc interpolation
was used in the transformation. The T1-weighted image
for each individual was coregistered to their mean func-
tional image created from the realigned images. The
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structural image was segmented in native space using
the VBM toolbox (VBM8) http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.
de/software. The resulting gray matter segment was then
normalized to the a priori Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) gray matter template supplied by SPM8. The
resulting parameters were then
applied to normalize the functional
images and T1-weighted images into
MNI space (Friston et al., 1995a).
The resulting pixel size in standard
stereotaxic coordinates was
2 ! 2 mm, with an interplane distance
of 2 mm. The normalized images
were finally smoothed with an isotro-
pic six FWHM Gaussian kernel prior
to statistical analysis.
Statistical analysis
The time series was filtered with a
high-pass filter of 128 s to remove
subject-specific low-frequency drifts.
The experimental conditions (e.g.
‘ToM’ relative to ‘Physical 1’) were
modeled using a boxcar function
convolved with a hemodynamic
response function (HRF) (Friston
et al., 1994) in the context of the gen-
eral linear model employed by SPM8.
Specifically, BOLD signal changes to
the ‘ToM’, ‘Empathy’ or ‘Chess’
respectively relative to ‘Physical 1’,
‘Physical 2’ or ‘Ball’ were modeled.
This resulted in three contrast images
per participant. Group results for each
task were generated by importing
individual contrast images into a
second-level analysis. A full-factorial
model was employed to establish the
overall pattern of activation for each
task. The variables, age, weighted
chess level, intentionality score and
short-term memory score were
entered into the model as covariates.
A ‘weighted chess level’ was given
to each participant to reflect their
expertise as a chess player. The
weighted chess level is based on the
intensity at which the individual has
played chess and the number of
correct responses they gave during
the fMRI chess task (i.e. the number
of times they agreed with the option
chosen by a Grand Master referred to
as ‘correct chess answers’). This was
calculated using the following formula:
Weighted chess level
¼ ðintensity ! correct chess answersÞ
The statistical parametric maps
were interpreted after applying a
false discover rate (FDR) correction with P< 0.05. Only
clusters of at least k % 10 voxels were selected for
inclusion in further analysis.
Second-level analysis revealed 12 significant clusters
in which activation was significantly greater for the
Fig. 1. Examples of a chess task scenario (A) and a control task scenario (B) for the fMRI chess
task. In image (A) the chess pieces on yellow squares indicate the piece that is to be moved (top
row – first image) or has been moved (top row – second and third images) and the block yellow
square indicates where the piece has moved from. The participant must decide which move they
would take next out of image 1 or image 2 (bottom row). In this example, image 1 is the correct
response. This game is taken from the 1998 game between Jan Timman and Rui Damaso (http://
www.chess.com/games/view?id=861309#), after moving 10.Nd5. Image B shows the control
condition; the ball can only move from one side of the chess board to the opposite side.
Participants must decide where the ball will land next. In this example image 1 is the correct
response.
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contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ across all participants. A mask
was then created for each of these cluster regions using
the toolbox MarsBaR (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) in
SPM8. Parameter estimates for all voxels within each
cluster region were obtained and these parameter
estimates were then averaged across the cluster region
for the three contrasts: ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–
‘Physical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’, using the second-
level contrast image. Regions of significant association
were identified using the Wake Forest University
Pickatlas (http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software#Pick
Atlas; Maldjian et al., 2004) using Talairach coordinates
of the most significant voxel (x, y, z mm).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for the chess variables used in this
study, and IMT scores can be found in Table 1.
Weighted chess level ranged from 5 to 36
(mean = 16.4, SD= 10.5).
Neural responses associated with the processing of
ToM stimuli (contrast ‘ToM’ – ‘Physical 1’), empathy
stimuli (contrast ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’) and chess
stimuli (contrast ‘Chess’–‘Ball’) can be seen across the
whole brain (in left and right hemispheres) in Fig. 2
(panels A, B and C respectively). The contrast ‘ToM’ –
‘Physical 1’ yielded a total of twelve areas of activation,
which are shown in Appendix A and Fig. 3. Contrast
values for comparisons ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–‘P
hysical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ were extracted across
these twelve regions (shown in Appendix A). Areas that
were significant for all three contrast conditions included
left hemisphere superior temporal gyrus [BA22 (Fig. 3,
region 6)] and posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23/31
(Fig. 3, region 5)] and right hemisphere temporoparietal
junction [BA40 (Fig. 3, region 4)]. Results showed
significant activation for the contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’
and ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ in right hemisphere medial
frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex [BA11 (Fig. 3, region 3)]
and bilateral medial temporal gyrus [BA21 (Fig. 3,
regions 1 and 2)]. Significant activation for the contrasts
‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ were found in six
of the twelve regions: left hemisphere cuneus [BA18
(Fig. 3, region 11)], fusiform gyrus [BA37 (Fig. 3, region
7)], inferior frontal gyrus [BA45 (Fig. 3, region 12)], and
right hemisphere pyramis/cerebellum posterior lobe
(Fig. 3, region 8), lingual gyrus [BA18 (Fig. 3, region 9)],
and middle occipital gyrus [BA19 (Fig. 3, region 10)].
Areas of activation for the contrast conditions ‘Empa
thy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ (tested across the
whole brain) are shown in Appendix B. The contrast
‘Empathy’ – ‘Physical 1’ yielded twelve areas of
activation in bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus [BA24],
and middle temporal gyrus [BA21], left hemisphere
superior [BA9] and inferior [BA45] frontal gyrus,
cingulate gyrus [BA24] and uvula/cerebellum posterior
lobe, and right hemisphere precuneus [BA7], inferior
parietal lobule [BA40], temporoparietal junction [BA40]
and medial frontal gyrus [BA11]. The contrast ‘Chess’–‘
Ball’ tested across the whole brain yielded ten areas of
activation in left hemisphere precuneus [BA7], caudate
tail, precentral gyrus [BA6], middle frontal gyrus [BA6
and BA46], posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23] and
culmen/cerebellum anterior lobe and right hemisphere
temporoparietal junction [BA40], middle frontal gyrus
[BA9] and declive/cerebellum posterior lobe.
The eﬀect of intentionality score, short-term memory
score, age and weighted-chess level was tested for
within the regions of activation generated from each of
the three contrasts (i.e. ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–‘P
hysical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’). No significant results
were found following correction for multiple comparisons
(FDR, P< 0.05).
DISCUSSION
Findings from the present study show a distributed neural
network involved in ToM, consistent with previous
literature (Lieberman, 2007; Carrington and Bailey,
2009), which shows a role for superior temporal gyrus
[BA22] (Vo¨llm et al., 2006) and superior temporal sulcus
[STS: BA21/22] (Allison et al., 2000; Frith and Frith,
2003; Vo¨llm et al., 2006; Enrici et al., 2011), temporo-
parietal junction [TPJ: BA40] (Gallagher et al., 2000;
Vo¨llm et al., 2006; Gobbini et al., 2007; Enrici et al.,
2011) and orbital PFC [OPFC] (Brunet et al., 2000;
Powell et al., 2010, 2014; Spreng et al., 2009; Vo¨llm
et al., 2006) in ToM processing. The study also showed
a role for cuneus [BA18], fusiform gyrus [BA37] and right
cerebellum associated with the ToM task, consistent with
the findings of Vo¨llm et al. (2006).
A total of twelve diﬀerent areas of activation were
found in relation to ToM processing, none of which were
unique to ToM itself. When the twelve regions were
used as pre-defined regions of interest all three tasks
were associated with significant neural activation in
three of the twelve regions: left hemisphere superior
temporal gyrus [BA22] and posterior cingulate gyrus
[BA23/31] and right hemisphere TPJ [BA40]. Previous
literature supports the role of each of these regions in
Table 1.Mean scores, standard deviations and minimum and maximum scores for age, weighted chess level (and the chess variables used to calculate
this score), years of playing chess, intentionality and short-term memory score (obtained from the IMT)
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Age (in years) 36.4 13.9 20 58
Weighted Chess level 16.4 10.5 5 36
Years playing chess 26.3 13.8 4 48
Intensity of chess play 2.2 1.1 1 4
Score on fMRI chess task 7.3 1.5 5 9
Intentionality (IMT) 4.6 0.3 4.1 4.9
Short-term Memory (IMT) 5.0 0.2 4.7 5.4
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ToM (Vo¨llm et al., 2006; for review see Lieberman, 2007),
chess (Campitelli et al., 2005) and empathy (for review
see Bernhardt and Singer, 2012) tasks. ToM and empa-
thy tasks were associated with significant activation in a
further three regions: right hemisphere medial frontal
gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex [BA11] and bilateral medial tem-
poral gyrus [BA21]; neural activation associated with the
chess task was not found in these three regions. Middle
and superior [BA21/22] temporal gyri are consistently
reported in ToM studies (Frith and Frith, 2003;
Lieberman, 2007), which supports the findings in the pre-
sent study. Middle temporal gyrus is bounded dorsally by
superior temporal sulcus which sits ventrally to the supe-
rior temporal gyrus. Posterior superior temporal gyrus
[BA22] is thought to be particularly sensitive to biological
motion (Allison et al., 2000), which is an externally
focused process that does not require consideration of
the other’s internal mental state. Other research indicates
a role for the superior temporal gyrus more generally in
movement kinematics not only perception of human
movement (Jastorﬀ and Orban, 2009), which might
explain its role in all three tasks used in the present study.
In addition to its role in ToM (e.g. Frith
and Frith, 2003; Vo¨llm et al., 2006;
Lieberman, 2007), middle temporal
gyrus [BA21] has been shown to be
sensitive to the visual evaluation of
action rationality (Jastorﬀ et al.,
2011). Jastorﬀ et al. (2011) found that
the medial temporal gyrus is sensitive
to weighing up predictions about
external reality made from an internal
working model. In their study, when
the expected pattern of rational goal
attainment was violated, there was
an increase in neural activity within
medial temporal gyrus. In this respect,
it is the action kinematics of the char-
acters (in the ToM and empathizing
task) and chess pieces (in the chess
task) that recruits neural activation in
superior temporal gyrus, but it is
the rationality of the characters in the
ToM and empathizing tasks, i.e.
the contextual elements in which the
characters are constrained by, that
leads to activation of middle temporal
gyrus. While rationality of the oppo-
nent’s move during the chess task
might be considered, the role of the
medial temporal gyrus might be con-
tingent on the relationship between
goal directed biological action and its
relevant environmental constraints.
Temporo-parietal junction [TPJ;
BA40: which consists of
supramarginal gyrus within inferior
parietal lobule (IPL) and a caudal
portion of the superior temporal
gyrus], is a key neural region in ToM
tasks (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). While
situated anatomically close to superior temporal sulcus,
the TPJ is considered to be distinct from this region when
it comes to its role in ToM tasks (Saxe et al., 2004). This
region is thought to be particularly important for reasoning
about the mental states of others, and is robustly reported
in imaging studies that involve ‘false-belief’ tasks (Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003). This region is also thought to be
important for distinguishing between self and other
(Lawrence et al., 2006). The empathy task used in the
present study involved imagining the aﬀective state of
another and comprises aﬀective sharing, self-awareness
and self-other distinction (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
It is not, therefore, surprising that TPJ significantly acti-
vated by the ToM task, was also significantly associated
with the empathy task. Neural activation associated with
the chess task was also found in TPJ. One explanation
for this association might be that TPJ was playing a sim-
ilar role during the chess task, as participants reasoned
about the potential mental states of the opponent. In all
tasks, it was right hemisphere TPJ that was activated,
which Saxe and Wexler (2005) have shown to be impor-
tant in the attribution of mental states. Another explana-
Fig. 2. Areas of activation associated with the contrasts: ‘ToM’ – ‘Physical 1’ (panel A); ‘Empathy’
– ‘Physical 2’ (panel B); and ‘Chess’ – ‘Ball’ (panel C), performed across whole brain. Significant
regions of activation are displayed laterally on a cortical surface rendered brain on the left
hemisphere and right hemisphere. Displayed results are significant at P< 0.05 with the false
discover rate (FDR) correction for multiple comparisons.
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tion for the role of TPJ during the chess task is that this
region is important for spatial processing skills (Marshall
et al., 1997; Fink et al., 2000, 2001; Powell et al.,
2012b; Richter et al., 1997), and the ability to focus atten-
tion on a particular stimuli or objective (Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), involved in the game of chess
(Atherton et al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005).
ToM tasks that require considering the contents of
another person’s mind (an internally focused process)
recruit dorsal PFC (Frith and Frith, 2003; German et al.,
2004) and orbital PFC (Powell et al., 2014). Previous
research supports the role of BA11 (which resides within
orbital PFC and partially within ventrolateral and ventrome-
dial PFC) in both ToM tasks (Lewis et al., 2011) and
empathizing tasks (Farrow et al., 2001). Greater activity
is observed in ventrolateral PFC and medial PFC when
individuals are asked to make empathic judgments relative
to other forms of social reasoning (Farrow et al., 2001). The
role of this region during empathizing tasks is suggested to
include the ability to inhibit one’s own experience during the
consideration of another’s state of mind (Vogeley et al.,
2001; Samson et al., 2005). Activation of BA11 was not
found in the chess task suggesting that this task required
neither empathic judgment nor inhibition of one’s own
experience when considering the mental state of another.
ToM and chess tasks were associated with significant
activation in a further six regions: left hemisphere cuneus
[BA18], fusiform gyrus [BA37], inferior frontal gyrus
[BA45], and right hemisphere pyramis/cerebellum
posterior lobe, lingual gyrus [BA18], and middle occipital
gyrus [BA19]. The majority of these regions i.e. BA18,
BA19, BA37 and cerebellum were observed in the study
by Vo¨llm et al. (2006) in relation to ToM processing. A
number of studies have also reported a role for the fusi-
form gyrus [BA37] in chess tasks (e.g. Righi and Tarr,
2004; Bukach et al., 2006). The suggestion has been that
the face-selective fusiform area can be hijacked to pro-
cess chess patterns; however, the findings regarding
the role of the fusiform gyrus in chess processing are
inconsistent (Krawczyk et al., 2011). Our findings suggest
that the fusiform area might support internal representa-
tions at least at an early perceptual level. That BA18
and BA19 within the occipital lobe are involved in the
ToM task is in line with some other literature showing a
role for occipital cortex in ToM tasks (Enrici et al., 2011).
Areas associated with chess when explored across the
whole brain included, left hemisphere precuneus [BA7],
caudate tail, precentral gyrus [BA6], middle frontal gyrus
[BA6 and BA46], posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23] and
culmen/cerebellum anterior lobe and right hemisphere
middle frontal gyrus [BA9] and declive/cerebellum
posterior lobe. This is consistent with previous studies
that have explored the neural correlates of chess (i.e.
Atherton et al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005). Campitelli
et al. (2005) also found distributed neural activation in
BA10, BA13, BA22, BA29, BA32, BA38, BA44, BA45,
and BA47, although it is worth noting that five of these
regions had a cluster size of k< 10 voxels – the present
study considered only clusters of 10 or more voxels. Using
a sample of seven novice male chess players Atherton
et al. (2003) found activation bilaterally in BA7, BA19,
BA39 and BA40 and left hemisphere BA6, BA8, BA9 and
cerebellum. Unlike the studies of Atherton et al. (2003)
and Campitelli et al. (2005) that used a one-shot scene
of a chess game, the task used in the present study
required the participants to follow a series of shots of a
game progressing and to decide (using a forced choice
task) which out of two options they would make next if they
were playing. This task may be considered more cogni-
tively demanding than those previously used.
The present study did not incorporate the three tasks
into a single paradigm and therefore did not allow for
direct comparisons in neural activation between the
diﬀerent tasks. To directly test for diﬀerences in neural
activation between ToM- and chess-related tasks, future
studies should consider incorporating these two diﬀerent
measures into the same paradigm. The present study
used a well-established ToM task and empathizing task
(Brunet et al., 2000; Vo¨llm et al., 2006) to activate neural
areas associated with either ToM and empathizing. Chess
level, in this study was calculated by multiplying the inten-
sity at which the individual has played chess since they
began playing the game by their score on the fMRI chess
task. Other scales for measuring chess are available, for
example the Elo scale (Elo, 1978) which is an international
rankingof chess expertise.However, ourmeasure of chess
expertise is based on the performance on the task
employed in the study which is taken from a database of
chess games played by masters and grand masters.
Cumulative hours of serious study alone are thought to
be the best predictor of a players’ current chess rating
(Charness et al., 2005). The present study did not include
hours of chess study within the calculation of chess exper-
tise due to the age range of this small sample and secondly,
because chess players were novice chess players who did
not engage in serious study of the game. The fact that only
novice chess players were used in the present study could
have implications for our results, as neuroimaging results
show that chess experts compared to novices present
increased neuronal activation in the ventral visual system,
TPJ, posterior cingulate gyrus, and orbitofrontal cortex
(Atherton et al., 2003; Bilalic´ et al., 2010, 2011a,b, 2012;
Krawczyk et al., 2011; Rennig et al., 2013). Such diﬀer-
ences in neuronal activity could beexplainedby diﬀerences
in the strategies employed between chess novices and
experts when playing the game of chess. Chess players
automatically activate chunks (perceptual patterns that
can be used as units of meaning) in long-term memory
when perceiving familiar positions (Chase and Simon,
1973; Gobet, 1998). At the novice level chess strategies
involve reasoning iteratively about the potential moves of
the opponent. Future studies should therefore consider
testing the neural overlap between ToM processing and
the game of chess in a group of expert chess players.
The acquisition of ToM has important consequences
as it allows individuals to negotiate through a largely
social word, for example, in conversations, negotiations,
the development of social relationships, moral
judgments and emotions and feeling trust (Korkmaz,
2011). ToM deficits are observed in individuals with a
range of neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism
(Happe´ and Frith, 1996), schizophrenia (Frith, 2014),
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bipolar aﬀective disorder (Bora et al., 2005), learning dif-
ficulty (Capps et al., 1998), attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (Uekermann et al., 2010) as well as Tourette’s
Syndrome (Eddy et al., 2011). However, not all those with
autism fail ToM tests. Findings from the present study
may suggest that those with deficits in ToM processing
might perform to a high level at chess tasks by depending
on chess associated regions outside the internal repre-
sentational network i.e. they would quickly employ a strat-
egy of activating chunks in long-term memory when faced
with a state of play during the game of chess.
A ‘core-network’ for ToM has been proposed, which
includes mPFC and bilateral TPJ (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002; Schurz
et al., 2014). These regions are consistently engaged
whenever we reason about the mental states of others,
regardless of task and stimuli (Schurz et al., 2014). A large
degree of overlap concerning areas of activation for the
ToM task and the empathizing task is not surprising given
that the selected empathizing task involves cognitively
inferring another’s aﬀective state rather than resonating
with another’s aﬀective state (Singer et al., 2004). The
Fig. 3. Twelve areas of activation yielded by the contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ (tested across the whole brain) corrected for multiple comparisons
(P< 0.05, FDR) shown on sagittal, coronal and axial planes on a single subject T1 MR image supplied by SPM8. Regions were extracted using the
toolbox MarsBaR for SPM8. Talairach coordinates (x, y, z) are given for the most significant voxel in each cluster. The corresponding BA region for
the Talairach coordinates can be seen in Appendix A. The twelve diﬀerent regions are numbered. LH= left hemisphere, RH= right hemisphere.
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chess task involved following the game of chess and
deciding which out of twomoves to make next. We hypoth-
esize that in our cohort of novice chess players the strat-
egy was to employ an iterative thinking pattern which in
part involved mentalizing processes and recruited core
ToM-related regions. This diﬀers to previous conceptions
of chess which is wholly considered as a game of pure
strategy.
SUMMARY
Findings from the present study support the evidence that
there is a core network which is recruited during ToM
tasks which form the core representational areas, and
were recruited during all three tasks in this study, with
task-specific areas commonly co-recruited alongside the
core areas dependent on the nature of the internal
representational task. The present study demonstrates
that, at least in novice chess players, there is a large
degree of neural overlap when considering potential
moves on a chess board and when considering ToM
scenarios. Future research should replicate the study
using a group of expert chess players. While these
results suggest that ToM and chess processing depend
on a very similar neural network, ToM also depends on
those regions responsible for inhibition of one’s own
experience when considering the mental state of
another and for visual evaluation of action rationality,
which are themselves not unique to ToM itself as they
are equally observed during tasks requiring empathy,
namely frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral
middle temporal gyrus. Chess, in contrast, depends on
an extended network covering middle frontal [BA6 and
46] and parietal cortex [BA7]. Individuals with deficits in
ToM processing, such as those with autism, would
perform poorly at ToM tasks but might perform to a high
level at chess tasks by depending on chess associated
regions outside the internal representational network.
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Appendix B. Activation for contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ Table B1. Cluster regions of activation for the contrast
conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ tested across the whole brain are shown along with their corresponding Brodmann area (BA),
Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), cluster size (in mm3) and z-scores. LH = left hemisphere, RH = right-hemisphere
Talairach coordinates (x, y, z) Area of activation BA Cluster size z-score
Contrast = ‘Empathy’ – ‘Physical 2’
12, &52, 34 Precuneus (RH) 7 1048 5.71
57, &13, &5 Medial Temporal Gyrus (RH) 21 274 5.34
&60, &10, &14 Medial Temporal Gyrus (LH) 21 966 5.18
54, &52, 28 Temporoparietal Junction (RH) 40 193 4.96
&1, &19, 34 Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 24 114 4.48
&3, 53, 31 Superior Frontal Gyrus (LH) 9 751 4.37
3, 26, 10 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (RH) 24 94 4.08
&54, 26, 1 Inferior Frontal Gyrus (LH) 45 35 3.88
&6, 17, &5 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 24 57 3.82
&27, &79, &26 Uvula/Cerebellum Posterior Lobe (LH) – 39 3.64
3, 50, &11 Medial Frontal Gyrus/Orbitofrontal Cortex (RH) 11 123 3.49
48, &31, 31 Inferior Parietal Lobule (RH) 40 57 3.13
Contrast = ‘Chess’ – ‘Ball’
30, &61, &23 Declive/Cerebellum Posterior Lobe (RH) – 2391 6.56
&21, &73, 46 Precuneus (LH) 7 1008 6.40
57, &52, 28 Temporoparietal Junction (RH) 40 99 5.58
&18, &31, 16 Caudate (LH) Caudate tail 48 5.17
&48, &1, 37 Precentral Gyrus (LH) 6 197 5.08
&45, 26, 25 Middle Frontal Gyrus (LH) 46 156 4.88
&33, &4, 55 Middle Frontal Gyrus (LH) 6 69 4.84
&30, &55, &26 Culmen/Cerebellum Anterior Lobe (LH) – 68 4.81
&66, &52, 19 Posterior Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 23 22 4.68
45, 38, 28 Middle Frontal Gyrus (RH) 9 69 4.58
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